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NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff does not dispute the nature of the case as
set forth in defendant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the record adequately supported the trial

court's Finding of Fact that Donna Hagblom, an employee of the
defendant, was not required by plaintiff to return to him any
portion of bonuses she had received from the defendant.
2.

Whether

the

trial

court

committed

error

in

determining that, as a matter of law, plaintiff's actions in
requesting two of defendant's maintenance men to provide maintenance services on his residence while they were on duty for
the defendant were not acts of moral turpitude or unethical
conduct.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 5, 1980, plaintiff and defendant executed
an Employment Agreement under which
defendant's

Club

Manager.

The

plaintiff

conditions

employment, including the obligations

of both

agreed
of

to

be

plaintiff's

plaintiff

defendant, were outlined in the Employment Agreement.

and

Findings

of Fact, 1f 3, R. 104; Ex. D-l, R. 6-8.
The

Employment

Agreement,

at

paragraph

1(f), sets

forth the conditions under which defendant could terminate the
plaintiff, and in what instances defendant was obligated to pay
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plaintiff liquidated damages subsequent to the termination:
If, in the judgment of the Board of Directors
of
Employer
[defendant],
Manager
[plaintiff] fails to perform any of his
obligations or duties hereunder, and the
Board of Directors determines that the
conduct
of
the
Manager
is unethical,
involves gross negligence or a breach of
moral turpitude, this Contract shall terminate at the option of the Employer upon
thirty (30) days notice to the Manager. In
the event, however, the Employer shall wish
to terminate this Contract without sufficient cause or reason, Employer shall pay
Manager one-third (1/3) of one-year's salary
as liquidated damages, (emphasis added)
R.7.

On January 23, 1983, defendant terminated the plaintiff.

At the time of his termination, his

salary was $41,400.00.

Findings of Fact, 1fir 4-5, R. 104.
Prior

to

the

trial

of

this

matter,

the

defendant

alleged that plaintiff engaged in certain acts that were either
unethical

or

defendant

were

asserted

post-termination
Agreement.
1.
one

of

acts

of

moral

plaintiff

liquidated

turpitude.
was

damages

not
under

Accordingly,
entitled

the

to

Employment

Defendant alleged that:
Plaintiff wrote checks on defendant's account to

defendant's

employees, Jeanette

Wilhelm,

from

which

checks plaintiff did not deduct Federal and State taxes and
FICA monies;
2.

Plaintiff wrote checks on defendant's account to

Bruce R. Hewitt, but Hewitt was not employed by the defendant
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at the time;
3.

Plaintiff wrote checks on defendant's account to

Frank Rotunno without defendant's authorization, which checks
compensated Rotunno for living expenses and travel expenses;
4.

Plaintiff

wrote

bonus

checks

on

defendant's

account to Donna Hagblom and Frank Rotunno, and required them
to pay him certain amounts from those bonus checks as a cash
kickback; and
5.

Plaintiff

Draper, both

maintenance

provide maintenance
these

employees

Counterclaim,

required

3-5,

on
R.

Stewart

and

Stephen

employed by the defendant, to

services to him

were

1f1f

men

Kevin

duty

for

12-13;

at

his

residence

defendant.
Defendant's

while

Defendant's
Answers

to

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, 1M[ 3-7, R. 26-28.
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses for both
sides, the trial court found that none of defendant's allegations

against

the

plaintiff

had

any

merit

except

that

maintenance services had been provided to the plaintiff at his
residence and at his request by defendant's maintenance men.
The court found that Jeanette Wilhelm had been hired by the
plaintiff as an independent contractor pursuant to plaintiff's
authority under the Employment Contract, and that because of
her status as an independent contractor, plaintiff did not have
to withhold Federal or State taxes or FICA monies from her
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checks.

The court found that of the two checks plaintiff wrote

to Bruce R. Hewitt, one was Hewitt's Christmas bonus (he had
been an employee of the defendant

earlier

that year).

The

second check was actually compensation for services provided by
Jeanette Wilhelm, but at her request, the plaintiff wrote the
check out to Hewitt.

The court further found that the checks

plaintiff wrote to Frank Rotunno for living and travel expenses
were authorized by Willowcreek Country Club board member Jerry
Butterfield, and that the payment of similar expenses, under
similar circumstances, had been authorized by the defendant in
the past

for both Rotunno

and the plaintiff.

Finally, the

court found that plaintiff did not require either Donna Hagblom
or Frank Rotunno to return any monies from any bonus checks
that the plaintiff wrote to those
Fact, W

upon

Findings of

that Kevin Stewart

and Stephen

14-17, R. 106-108.
The

Draper

individuals.

court

provided

his

find

maintenance

residence

Country Club.

did

while

services

they

were

at plaintiff's

request

on duty at Willowcreek

The court found specifically that Stewart pro-

vided approximately 12 hours worth of housecleaning services to
the plaintiff, for which the plaintiff occasionally paid him.
The court also found that Draper spent 2 hours one afternoon
servicing plaintiff's evaporative
of Fact, 1f1f 11 and 13, R. 105-106.
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("swamp") cooler.

Findings

The court then concluded as

a matter of law that plaintiff's requests for the maintenance
men's services on his residence were not acts of moral turpitude or unethical conduct.

Conclusions of Law, 1f 3, R. 108.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Defendant asserts on appeal that there was not

adequate evidence in the record to support the trial court's
Finding of Fact that Donna Hagblom was not required by the
plaintiff to "kick back" monies to him from her bonus checks.
The standard of review for such an argument is that a trial
court's Findings of Fact will be presumed to be correct, and
will not be overturned, as long as they are adequately supported by the evidence in the record.

Both plaintiff and a

witness for the plaintiff, Frank Rotunno, testified at length
that plaintiff did not request any monies from Donna Hagblom as
a kick back from bonuses that he had given to her from defendant's

funds.

In

fact, Hagblom herself

testified

that she

wasn't certain if Rotunno or the plaintiff asked her to return
monies from her bonus checks.
II.

The plaintiff's request of maintenance

services

upon his personal residence from defendant's employees was not
an act of moral turpitude or unethical conduct.
at first

The defendant

analogizes plaintiff's request to a "theft of ser-

vices" crime, and then assumes that plaintiff in fact committed
such a crime.

Defendant then argues that the commission of
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such

a crime

conduct.

is

an

act

of

moral

turpitude

and

unethical

Defendant put on no evidence at trial with regard to

plaintiff's actions fulfilling the elements of the crime of
theft of services.

Because it was not an issue at the trial

level, the plaintiff put on no evidence with regard to his
reasons for requesting the services from defendant's employees,
for example that he thought he was entitled to them or that he
thought the defendant would not mind his use of the employees
for such a small amount of time.

Notwithstanding defendant's

attempt to characterize plaintiff's acts as criminal in nature,
when examined in and of themselves, the actions do not rise to
the level of moral turpitude or unethical conduct, as defined
in the treatises and case law.
III. The trial court did not err
dant's motion for a new trial.

in denying defen-

The basis for defendant's claim

of error is that the trial court allegedly failed to consider
testimony by Donna Hagblom and Annie Laurie Baker that plaintiff required Hagblom to return some of the monies from her
bonuses
record.

to

him.

This

claim

is without

foundation

in

the

Clearly the trial court did consider such testimony,

but found plaintiff's testimony and rebuttal more persuasive,
because the trial court made a specific finding of fact that
plaintiff did not require Hagblom to return those monies to him.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The record adequately supports the trial court's
finding that plaintiff did not require Donna
Hagblom to give monies from her bonus checks to
plaintiff•
A.

Standard
of
Review
of
Sufficiency
Evidence Underlying Findings of Fact.

of

It is well established that a trial court's Findings of Fact will be presumed to be correct, and will not be
overturned, as long as they are adequately
evidence

in

the

record.

Wessel

Company, 15 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37

v.

supported by the

Erickson

(1985)x.

Landscaping

On appeal, the

evidence in the record, and all inferences that might reasonably

be

drawn

therefrom,

will

be viewed

favorable to the judgment entered.

in

a

light

most

Hal Taylor Associates v.

Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1982); Nielsen v.
Chin - Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980).

It is not

the prerogative of the appellate court to determine whether the

1.
In footnote 2 of the Wessel opinion, the court
noted that previous cases held the standard for determining the
sufficiency of the evidence necessary to sustain a finding to
be whether the evidence was "substantial." The court then
distinguished between the standard of review of a jury's findings and a judge's findings, and concluded that a slightly
broader standard of review for the findings of a judge, that of
"adequate evidence," is appropriate.
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evidence preponderated on one side or the other.

The appellate

court will only determine whether the evidence in the record
adequately supports the lower court ruling.

Reimschiissel v.

Russell, 649 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1982).
In a case recently decided by the Utah Supreme Court,
the appellant challenged the trial court's Findings of Fact in
an almost identical manner to defendant's instant appeal.

The

appellant presented its argument based upon the facts as it had
presented

them

findings.

at trial, rather than upon the trial court's

The Utah Supreme

Court

stated

that

in order

to

attack Findings of Fact, an appellant must first marshal all
the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then
demonstrate that, even viewing it in the light most favorable
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings.
1985).

Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah

In the Scharf case, the appellant had not presented

evidence supporting his version of the facts, much less the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings.

In the instant

case, the defendant has presented some evidence on the record
supporting

its

version

of

the

facts,

but

has

failed

to

enlighten the court as to the extensive evidence supporting the
trial court's findings.
B.

Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Finding of
Fact

The defendant argues that uncontroverted evidence at
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trial

supports

Hagblom

to

a finding that

the

plaintiff

required

Donna

"kickback" some of her bonus money to him.

The

court found otherwise, and had substantial reason to so find.
During defendant's cross-examination of Frank Rotunno,
a former employee at Willow Creek Country Club, Rotunno testified about a bonus he received from the plaintiff, and about
the monies from that bonus that he voluntarily returned to the
plaintiff:
A: I said I received a part of a $600
bonus for the Utah Open. A part of it.
Q:

A part of it?

A:

Yes.

Q:

How much did you receive?

A:

$300.

Q:
Mr. Rotunno, at the time you
received that bonus of $300 did you keep the
full amount?
A:

No sir.

Q: What happened to the proceeds of
the check?
A:
I gave with consent from another
party working at the club $100 to Mr. Jerry
Aarts.
Q: Who was the other party working at
the club you are talking about?
A: I believe the young lady over there
in the sort of dark blue suit. (Indicating).
[Mr.
Rotunno
pointed
to Donna
Hagblom.]
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Q: Why did you return $100 of the $300
to Mr. Aarts?
A:
When I received the $300 bonus I
asked Mr. Aarts if he was going to take any
part of it. He said "no." I said "well, I
don't think it's right." So I then went to
this young lady and told her the situation
and said, "I think we ought to give Jerry
some money."
That is my doing, and Mr.
Aarts knew nothing about it and refused it.
Q: Your testimony is that he refused
the $100?
A:
The first time, yes, sir.
I
insisted he take it and left it on the desk,
my money and her money. We gave $100 apiece
and that was at my suggestion, and my
suggestion only.
Mr. Aarts knew nothing
about it nor did she until I talked to her.
Q:
In other words, this was
gratuity on your part?
A: Just a nice gesture.
and I gave in return.
Q:
With
expenses and —

respect

to

just

a

He gave me,
these

living

A:
I would like to make a note, sir,
that when I approached the young lady and I
said to her, "I think we ought to give him
$100 apiece," I also said that it would be
very good for her because I thought that
when I left she would become the assistant
manager, and she then gave me the $100.
Q:
It's your testimony that she gave
you an additional $100?
A:
Q:
Aarts?

She gave me $100 of the $300.
You in turn gave those funds to Mr.
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A

Yes, I did.

Q

You did that as a gratuity?

A

I gave that as a gesture.

Q

A gesture of what?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Of what?

A

Of appreciation.

And you were well paid, were you
Q
not, for your work at Willow Creek Country
Club.
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
Why did you feel that you should
have to give Mr. Aarts anything?
A:
I didn't feel
Aarts anything.

I had to give Mr.

R. 189-192.
Defendant

noted

in

its

brief

that

Donna

Hagblom

testified of meetings with Jerry Aarts and Frank Rotunno where
she was required to return some monies from her bonus checks to
the plaintiff.

R. 232-238.

However, what the defendant did

not note was Hagblom1s testimony

regarding her

fuzzy memory

about these meetings.
Q:
[By Mr. Oritt] . Okay. Now, when
you testified about this meeting between you
and Jerry Aarts and Frank Rotunno you said
that they said to keep quiet about it. Do
you recall who said it, if Jerry said it or
if Frank said it? Do you remember which one?
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A:
I
which one.

really,

truly

don't

remember

Q:
So it could have been Frank who
said don't you think you should give over
some of this money to Jerry?
A:

Could have been.

R. 238.
In rebuttal

testimony, the plaintiff

testified with

regard to meetings with Donna Hagblom concerning her bonuses.
Q:
[By Mr. Oritt].
Directing your
attention to the testimony of Mrs. Hagblom
earlier today, tell me, Mr. Aarts, why did
you give bonuses to Mr. Rotunno and Mrs.
Hagblom after the Utah Open in 1982?
A:
It wasn't only Donna Hagblom and
Frank Rotunno.
There was a dozen or so
employees that had worked above and beyond.
We put in a lot of hours.
I think we
averaged about 70 hours each that week
setting up the stands outside and breaking
them down. The staff that is normally not
on that gratuity fund, the service personnel, say the bus boys and waiters and
waitresses, bartenders, I distributed a
portion of that fund to these people and the
people in the office. We had a girl stand
on the golf course to check the cash from
the office. Annie Laurie was picking up the
cash.
Q:

It was a pretty big event, wasn't

it?
A: Yes, it was. Sharon Luhse was on
the snack bar and sold sandwiches at the
tee, and we had this money left over in the
gratuity fund and that's how we distributed
it.
Q: What kind of hours did
during that event?
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you

keep

A:

Same amount of hours, 70.

Q:

70 hours?

A:

Something like that.

Q:
Now,
with
reference
to Mrs.
Hagblom's testimony being required to give
some of her money back after the Utah Open,
do you recall any meeting between you and
Frank Rotunno and Mrs. Hagblom about the
bonuses?
A:
I recall a meeting where
them each a $300 check and then I
Frank imposed whether in my presence
in my presence, Frank said to Donna .

I gave
believe
or not
..

Q: Mr. Aarts, do you recall where this
meeting took place?
A:

No, I do not.

Q: All right.
at the meeting?
A:

Do you recall who was

Myself, Donna and Frank.

Q:
And —
and —
okay.
Let's take
this a step at a time. What did you first
do with the bonus checks?
A:

I gave them each a $300 check.

Q:

What happened next?

A: The meeting broke and I think Frank
came back to me and he said, "I spoke to
Donna, and we want you to have this." I
said, "Frank, I don't want any part of it."
He said, "no. Donna and I got together and
we feel you should have some of this."
Q:

What did he give you?

A:

$100 from Frank and $100 from Donna.

-13-

Q:
All right.
Mrs. Hagblom also
testified about you requiring some money
back from a Christmas bonus. Do you have
any recollection of that?
A:

No sir.

Q:

Did that ever happen?

A:

No sir.

Q:
Do you
Christmas bonus?

recall

giving

her

a

A: I gave her not a bonus. I gave her
extra money above and beyond because she
worked very hard over the holidays, during
the, you know, Lights On Season and parties
and so forth. I gave her a bonus for that.
I gave her extra compensation.
Q: Did you ever ask her to give any of
that back?
A:

No sir.

R. 266-269.
Frank

Rotunno

was

recalled

by

the

plaintiff

as a

rebuttal witness, subsequent to Mrs. Hagblom's testimony.

Mr.

Rotunno testified, on direct examination and cross-examination,
that a meeting between Jerry Aarts, Frank Rotunno

and Donna

Hagblom, to which Mrs. Hagblom testified, never took place.
testified that he spoke with Mrs. Hagblom
tiff's presence and discussed

returning

He

outside of plain-

some of their bonus

monies to him, and that she voluntarily agreed to do so.

R.

274-278.
In short, plaintiff put on a substantial
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amount of

evidence by which the trial court could find, and in fact did
find, that Hagblom had voluntarily returned some of her bonus
money to the plaintiff, and that she was not required to do so
by the plaintiff.

The defendant, however, ignores the substan-

tial evidence rebutting its witness' testimony and assumes, for
purposes of its brief, that Donna Hagblom was required to "kick
back" monies from her bonuses to the plaintiff.

Defendant then

argues that such a "kickback" is an act of moral turpitude.
The court need not determine whether such a "kickback" would be
an act of moral turpitude.
substantial

evidence,

in

There is adequate evidence, indeed
the

record

to

support

the

trial

court's Finding of Fact regarding monies given back by Donna
Hagblom

to

the

plaintiff,

and

therefore

the

trial

court's

finding must be upheld.
II.

Plaintiff's request of maintenance services from
defendant's employees was not an act of moral
turpitude.

The

trial

maintenance
defendant's
Stewart

court

found

that

services on his personal
employees,

provided

12

Kevin

hours

residence

Stewart

of

plaintiff

service

and
at

requested

from

Stephen
the

two of
Draper.

plaintiff's

residence over the course of plaintiff's two and one-half years
of employment by the defendant.
service at the plaintiff's

Draper provided

2 hours of

residence during that time.
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The

trial court ruled that, since the men were on duty for the
defendant when they worked for the plaintiff, plaintiff should
reimburse the club the fair market value of the maintenance
men's

services,

plus

transportation

costs,

totalling

$105.

Findings of Fact, 1f1f 11, 13, R. 105-106; Conclusions of Law,
ir 4, R. 108-109.
As with its argument regarding Donna Hagblom's alleged
"kickbacks", the defendant here attempts a boot-strapping argument in order to persuade this Court that plaintiff's acts rise
to the level of moral turpitude.
because

the

plaintiff

The defendant argues that,

improperly

requested

services

from

defendant's maintenance men for his personal use, he ;is guilty
of theft of services, which is per force an act of moral turpitude.

But defendant's

argument fails because the assumption

upon which it is based is incorrect.

The trial court did not

rule as a matter of law that plaintiff's use of defendant's
maintenance men was a theft of services.
Defendant did not put on evidence at the trial level
fulfilling the elements of the crime of theft of services.
Notably lacking in the record is any evidence of the intent of
the plaintiff to deprive the defendant of services.
services

is

a

specific

intent crime.

Theft of

The prosecution must

prove that the accused had the intent to deprive the rightful
owner of the services.

The accused can defend the charge by
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claiming that he either acted in the honest belief that he had
the right to obtain or exercise control over the services as he
did, or that he obtained or exercised control over the services
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.

§ 76-6-402(3) (b) and

amended).

(c), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as

Had the defendant presented evidence as to the issue

of theft of services in this case, the plaintiff could have
responded, defending his actions, and the court would have made
the requisite Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In-

stead, defendant assumes on appeal that plaintiff's actions are
a theft of services and are "malum in se", that is, an act that
is evil in itself, like murder, rape, or kidnapping.

However,

"malum in se" crimes require only general intent, not specific
intent.

In crimes such as those, and not in specific intent

crimes like theft of services, a person is presumed to intend
the natural consequences of his act which can be inferred from
the words and conduct of the actor.

Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d

367, 369-370 (Utah 1978).
Clearly, theft of services

is not

crime, and, therefore, the defendant must

a "malum
prove

in se"

plaintiff's

specific intent to commit theft of services, in order to argue
that

his

actions

in

asking

defendant's

maintenance

men

to

perform some maintenance work on his personal residence rise to
the level of moral turpitude.
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request

The

Court

must

for

services

determine

by

on

appeal

if

plaintiff's

defendant's maintenance men on his

residence, while they were on duty for defendant, was an act of
moral turpitude.

An act of moral turpitude has been defined as

An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man.
United

States

v. Smith, 420 F.2d

428, 431

(5th Cir.

1970)

(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1160 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1957)).
There is little case law clarifying the definition of
moral turpitude.

In the context of deportation of aliens, acts

of moral turpitude have included bigamy, breaking and entering,
burglary, carnal knowledge of females under the age of consent,
counterfeiting, forgery, lewdness, manslaughter
degree,

rape

and

robbery.

§ 94(d)(7) at 720.

CORPUS

JURIS

SECUNDUM,

immoral

in

Aliens,

In a lawyer discipline case, the Oklahoma

Supreme Court concluded that "moral turpitude"
thing

in the first

and

of

itself,

regardless

implied someof whether

the

behavior decried as an act of moral turpitude was punishable by
law.

State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Association v. Denton, 598 P.2d

663, 664 (Okla. 1979).
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that, where the
issue before it is one of law, it is not bound by the conclusions

of

the

trial

court

and
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may determine the question.

Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587, n.l (Utah 1982).

Accord,

Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d at 1070 (Utah 1985).

The

trial court concluded that plaintiff's actions were not acts of
moral turpitude.

Conclusions of Law, 1[ 3, R. 108.

submits that plaintiff's

acts

Plaintiff

in requesting the services of

defendant's maintenance men for his personal

residence

cer-

tainly did not rise to the level of ". . . a n act of baseness,
vileness or depravity . . . M .

Perhaps plaintiff's actions were

ill-advised, and he should have checked with the defendant to
determine if he could utilize defendant's maintenance men for
the brief period of time that he did.

But, as a matter of law,

plaintiff's actions were not acts of moral turpitude, and the
trial

court's

conclusion

of

law

to

that

effect

should

be

affirmed.
Ill. The
trial
court
did
not
err
defendant's Motion for a new trial.
Defendant
testimony

by

claims

Donna

in

denying

that the court failed to consider

Hagblom

and

Annie

Laurie

Baker

that

plaintiff required that Hagblom return some of the monies from
her bonuses to him.
court

refused

to

Defendant then argues that, because the

consider

its

testimony

to that end, it's

denial of defendant's Motion for a new trial is error.
The trial court specifically found that there was no
evidence preponderating to defendant's benefit that Hagblom was
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required to return some monies from her bonuses in cash to the
plaintiff.

Findings of Fact, 1f 17, R. 108.

Furthermore, as

set forth earlier in this Brief, there was substantial testimony

by

the

plaintiff

and

by

Frank

Rotunno

that

directly

controverted the testimony of Donna Hagblom and Annie Laurie
Baker.
Under the very cases defendant cites in its Brief that
set forth the standard for reversing a trial court's denial of
a Motion for

a new trial

if "the

evidence

to

support

the

verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust,"
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982), the trial
court's denial of the defendant's Motion for a new trial should
be affirmed, as there was substantial evidence to support its
verdict.
IV.

Plaintiff's request of services from defendant's
maintenance men does not rise to the level of
unethical conduct.

The

trial

court

found

that

Donna

Hagblom

was

not

required by the plaintiff to return any monies to plaintiff
from her bonuses, thus leaving the only action of plaintiff
that defendant alleges is unethical to be his request for, and
receipt of, services from defendant's maintenance men on his
personal residence.
Defendant argues that the trial court's order of an
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offset of $105, to be paid by plaintiff to the defendant for
the services of defendant's maintenance men, implies a legal
conclusion that plaintiff's actions were unethical.

Contrar-

ily, the trial court specifically concluded that those actions
did not rise to the level of unethical conduct.

The defendant

again analogizes to theft of services, and tries to boot-strap
its assumption that plaintiff's actions were theft of services
into a legal argument that, because plaintiff committed theft
of services, he is guilty of unethical conduct.

Once again,

defendant's argument fails because the assumption that there
was a theft is incorrect.

The court made no such finding or

conclusion.
There is even less case law or discussion in treatises
about unethical conduct

than about acts of moral turpitude.

Black's Law Dictionary defines unethical conduct as:

"Conduct

not according to business or professional standards."

BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY 1698 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968).

There was no evidence

put on by either side at the trial level as to professional
standards of private club managers.
as a matter

of

law, that

The trial court concluded,

plaintiff's

actions

in utilizing

defendant's maintenance men for a few hours on his personal
residence were not unethical.
plaintiff's

actions

were

Plaintiff submits that, while

perhaps

actions were not unethical.
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ill-advised,

certainly

his

V.

Costs and Attorney's Fees

The trial court awarded the plaintiff the costs and
attorney's

fees

he

incurred

in

enforcing

the

Employment

Agreement, pursuant to 1f 3 of the Employment Agreement. R. 3.
Plaintiff prays at this time for an Order by this Court awarding him his costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending
this appeal.
CONCLUSION
There is more than adequate evidence in the record to
support the trial court's Finding of Fact that Donna Hagblom
was not required by the plaintiff to "kick back" monies from
her bonus to him.

The trial court made a specific Finding of

Fact on that issue, thereby supporting its denial

of defen-

dant's motion for a new trial.
The only act of the plaintiff that defendant can ask
this Court to review in the context of legal standards for acts
of moral turpitude and unethical conduct is plaintiff's request
of services upon his personal residence from defendant's maintenance men.

The trial court found that plaintiff's request

was not an act of moral turpitude or unethical conduct, and
merely ordered him to compensate defendant for the fair market
value

of

the

services

transportation costs.

of defendant's

employees, plus their

Given the prevailing legal definitions

of acts of motal turpitude and unethical conduct, the trial
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court's Conclusion of Law that plaintiff's acts did not rise to
the level of unethical conduct or acts of moral turpitude must
be affirmed.
Accordingly, plaintiff

urges that the trial court's

Judgment be affirmed on all issues of fact and law.

Plaintiff

also urges this Court to award him his costs and attorney's
fees incurred in defending,this appeal.
DATED this

// '

day of November, 1985.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Plaintiff-Respondent
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